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Abstract
Many commonly used data sources in the social sciences suffer from non-random mea-
surement error, understood as mis-measurement of a variable that is systematically
related to another variable. We argue that studies relying on potentially suspect data
should take the threat this poses to inference seriously and address it routinely in a
principled manner. In this article, we aid researchers in this task by introducing a sen-
sitivity analysis approach to non-random measurement error. The method can be used
for any type of data or statistical model, is simple to execute, and straightforward to
communicate. This makes it possible for researchers to routinely report the robustness
of their inference to the presence of non-random measurement error. We demonstrate
the sensitivity analysis approach by applying it to two recent studies.
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Non-random measurement error, understood as mis-measurement of a variable that is
systematically related to another variable, is a problem in many social science studies. For
example, characteristics such as education affect whether survey respondents misrepresent
their turnout behavior (Bernstein, Chandha and Montjoy, 2001; Katz and Katz, 2010; An-
solabehere and Hersh, 2012). The same is true for other sensitive questions, such as about
corruption (Jensen, Li and Rahman, 2010) or racial prejudice (Kuklinski, Cobb and Gilens,
1997). Autocratic regimes have incentives to misreport official statistics like inflation or
growth (Hollyer, Rosendorff and Vreeland, 2011; Wallace, 2016). NGOs that provide data
may over- or under-report some observations to further their advocacy role (Hill, Moore and
Mukherjee, 2013). Poor and less urbanized countries are more likely to miss infant deaths,
leading to systematically biased infant mortality rates (Anthopolos and Becker, 2009). The
availability of cellphone coverage in an area may increase the probability that political vio-
lence is reported in event data (Dafoe and Lyall, 2015; Weidmann, 2016). Historical data is
more accurate for some areas than for others (Albouy, 2012; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robin-
son, 2012). And due to technological advances, time series data is more likely to miss relevant
events further in the past, for example war casualties or human rights abuses (Gohdes and
Price, 2013; Lacina and Gleditsch, 2013; Fariss, 2014).
Best efforts notwithstanding, it is often impossible to eliminate such non-random mea-
surement error or avoid data that contains it. This can lead to biased inference. In the cases
cited above, debates about findings drawn from potentially problematic data have ensued,
but they are the exception rather than the norm. The threat non-random measurement
error poses to inference is not regularly addressed. Frequently, authors rely on informal ar-
guments that the problem is not “bad enough” to render their inference invalid, or the issue
is ignored (Herrera and Kapur, 2007). We argue that studies relying on potentially suspect
data should take the threat this poses to inference seriously and routinely address it in a
principled manner.
1
In this article, we aid researchers in this task by introducing a sensitivity analysis ap-
proach to non-random measurement error. It consists of three steps. First, researchers
quantify the potential measurement error. While the true data-generating process is un-
observable, a researcher tends to have an idea about what variable corrupts the data in
what direction. We provide advice about how to quantify direction and magnitude of the
potential non-random measurement error. In a second step, the variable is simulated given
different assumptions about mis-measurement. Finally, these simulated variables are used
to re-estimate the original model and the researcher can assess the inferential quantity of
interest depending on the level of measurement error. To demonstrate the method, we apply
it to two recent debates in the literature.
The simulation-based sensitivity analysis has a number of advantages for applied re-
searchers. The method is simple to understand and execute, it can be used for any type of
data or statistical model, and the results can be communicated in a straightforward manner.
This makes it possible to routinely report how inference changes given different levels of
measurement error, and to specify precisely how severe the error needs to be before the data
no longer supports one’s hypotheses. It thus provides an important step towards increasing
transparency in social science research.
The Problem of Non-Random Measurement Error
Why is there Non-Random Measurement Error?
In this paper, we are interested in measurement error that is systematically influenced by a
second, “corrupting” variable. Why can observed data systematically differ from the truth?
Two of the most common reasons are that there are differential incentives to misrepresent, or
that the data creators systematically differ in their capabilities (Herrera and Kapur, 2007).
The problems posed by incentives are well known to survey researchers. Respondents
often have reasons to answer questions untruthfully. The classic example is self-reported
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turnout, which is usually higher than actual election participation. This would not neces-
sarily be problematic for inference if all non-voters were equally likely to misrepresent their
behavior. However, there is evidence that characteristics such as education systematically
influence over-reporting, leading to biased inference (e.g. Bernstein, Chandha and Montjoy,
2001; Katz and Katz, 2010; Ansolabehere and Hersh, 2012). The incentive problem in sur-
vey research is present for many other questions that address sensitive issues (e.g. Kuklinski,
Cobb and Gilens, 1997; Jensen, Li and Rahman, 2010).
Incentive structures lead to inaccurate data outside of surveys as well. For example,
national statistical agencies can be subject to political pressures. Autocratic regimes in
particular tend to report information that overstates their performance (Hollyer, Rosendorff
and Vreeland, 2011; Wallace, 2016). Many non-governmental organizations provide data,
but their primary role is advocacy. These two can come into conflict. For example, the
widely used torture data from Amnesty International overstates the severity of the problem
when media coverage of the issue in a country is high (Hill, Moore and Mukherjee, 2013).
A lack of capability is a second reason why true and reported data may diverge. Some
countries have higher capabilities to accurately report information than others. Poor and less
urbanized countries are more likely to miss relevant events, resulting in e.g. the systematic
underestimation of their infant mortality rates (Anthopolos and Becker, 2009). Historical
data are often spotty, unevenly maintained, and not directly comparable (Albouy, 2012).
Increased data collection capabilities over time affect time series data, for example on human
rights abuses (Fariss, 2014) or war casualties (Gohdes and Price, 2013; Lacina and Gleditsch,
2013). And even with today’s modern technologies, measuring conflict is challenging. A
recently popularized approach is to rely on data sets that measure conflict based on media
coverage of violent events (e.g. Sundberg and Melander, 2013). But factors such as ruralness
and cellphone coverage influence the probability that an incident is reported (Dafoe and
Lyall, 2015; Weidmann, 2016).
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These are some examples showing that non-random measurement error is the subject of
scholarly debates and that data quality is a concern in the social sciences. However, such
systematic discussions are the exception rather than the norm (Herrera and Kapur, 2007).
What are the consequences of ignoring the issue?
What are the Consequences of Non-Random Measurement Error?
Suppose we have n observations Y = (y1, . . . , yn), for which the following relationship is true:
Y = β0 + β1T + β2C + β3W + ǫ (1)
where T = (t1, . . . , tn) is the treatment, C = (c1, . . . , cn) and W = (w1, . . . , wn) are two
other variables, and ǫ = (ǫ1, . . . , ǫn) is a random error term such that ǫi ∼ N(0, σ
2). Denote
the design matrix Z1 = [1, T, C,W ]. If none of the variables contain measurement error,
a standard OLS estimation (βˆ = (Z1
TZ1)
−1Z1
TY ) will yield an unbiased estimate of β =
[β0, β1, β2, β3].
However, suppose that instead of T we observe X = f(T |C). That is, the observed value
is a function of the true value, conditional on the value of a “corrupting” variable. If we
denote Z2 = [1, X, C,W ], we will obtain an OLS estimate δˆ = (Z2
TZ2)
−1Z2
TY . As we
derive in the Online Appendix, δˆ is a biased estimate of β , with the bias being
β − E(δˆ) =


β1
∑n
i=1(ti − xi)(d11 + d12xi + d13ci + d14wi)
β1
∑n
i=1(ti − xi)(d21 + d22xi + d23ci + d24wi)
β1
∑n
i=1(ti − xi)(d31 + d32xi + d33ci + d34wi)
β1
∑n
i=1(ti − xi)(d41 + d42xi + d43ci + d44wi)


(2)
where the terms denoted with d are the entries of a 4× 4 matrix D ≡ (Z2
TZ2)
−1. Equation
(2) provides a number of insights. First, bias depends on the sum of the differences between
the true and the observed variable. Of course, this quantity is unobservable, so we cannot
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know the extent of the bias. Second, the systematic measurement error in X can not only
lead to bias in its associated coefficient but, depending on the covariance structure, it may
also affect the coefficients of the other variables. Finally, note that the measurement error
in X is caused by C, which is included in the regression. This means that simply controlling
for the variable that induces mis-measurement is not enough to obtain unbiased estimates.1
To demonstrate the bias induced by non-random measurement error conditional on a
corrupting variable, we conduct a Monte Carlo simulation. We simulate a variable Y with
1000 observations as in Equation (1), where ti ∼ N (3, 2), ci ∼ B(0.2), wi ∼ N (1, 1), and
ǫi ∼ N (0, 1). In addition, we allow for T and W to be correlated (at 0.3), which can happen
in observational studies. Instead of T , we observe X where xi = ηti whenever ci = 1, with
η = 2. That is, for 20 percent of the observations, the observed value of the treatment is
twice as high as the true value.
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Figure 1: Monte Carlo Simulation of Effect of Non-Random Measurement Error. Den-
sity of estimated coefficients with non-random measurement error. Gray lines show true
coefficients.
Figure 1 demonstrates that this leads to bias in all three coefficients of interest. Most
importantly, the estimate of the treatment effect δˆ1 is far away from the true value, as
is the coefficient for the corrupting variable. If there is a correlation between T and the
control variable W , δˆ3 is also biased.
2 Thus, if a variable suffers from measurement error
1 In the Online Appendix, we derive the bias when measurement error occurs in the dependent variable.
2 δˆ3 is unbiased if there is no correlation between the two.
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that is systematically determined by a “corrupting” variable, all estimated coefficients can
be biased, resulting in misleading inference.
What are Existing Approaches to Address the Problem?
One of the reasons for the lack of attention to non-random measurement error, we believe,
is the sparsity of user-friendly statistical methods that can address the problem. There is
a large literature on statistical approaches to address random measurement error, and a
number of general and easy-to-use methods exist. Examples are simulation extrapolation,
instrumental variable regression, or multiple overimputation (e.g. Carroll and Stefanski, 1990;
Cook and Stefanski, 1994; Guolo, 2008; Blackwell, Honaker and King, 2015). In comparison,
the literature on non-random measurement error is relatively small.
One way to address non-random measurement error is to model it directly, for example
through regression calibration (for an overview see Carroll et al., 2006). The basic idea is
to first find a model for E(T |X,Z), where Z is a covariate matrix. The main model is then
estimated with E(T |X,Z) instead of the mis-measured variable X. While regression calibra-
tion is frequently used to address random measurement error, it is possible to incorporate
non-random error as well (Kipnis et al., 1999, 2001). This approach requires a calibration
data set that contains both T and X. With a few exceptions (e.g. election studies with
validated turnout) such data is unfortunately not available to political scientists.
Another approach is to utilize statistical methods that account for the error in indirect
ways, usually by adding a component that captures the “noise.” Hill, Moore and Mukherjee
(2013) accomodate an excess of “high torture” reports issued by Amnesty International by
estimating a zero-inflated ordered probit model, where one equation focuses on the non-
random measurement error. Anthopolos and Becker (2009) introduce frontier regression,
which splits the error term to include a one-sided term that captures the effect of non-
random measurement error. However, both of these techniques are only applicable if the
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measurement error occurs in the dependent variable. They are also restricted with respect
to the variable type they can accommodate.
A number of contributions instead develop variations of statistical estimators that are
more robust to measurement error. Hug (2010) introduces a probit estimator developed by
Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton (1998) that corrects for bias introduced by misclas-
sification in the dependent variable. This is achieved through modeling the probability of
misclassification explicitly. Betz (2013) develops a 2SLS instrumental variables estimator
that is more robust to non-random measurement error in the endogenous variable. It makes
use of the fact that rankings of observations are less sensitive to measurement error than the
actual values. Again, both of these models require that the measurement error occurs in a
specific type of variable, and are only applicable given certain research designs.
Finally, a different way to address non-random measurement error is sensitivity analysis.
Its central idea is to test how violations of model assumptions affect inference. Sensitivity
analysis has recently gained popularity in the context of (quasi-)experimental studies, where
it is possible that unobserved confounders are correlated with treatment assignment and/or
outcomes. The researcher identifies a range of scenarios where there are deviations from the
ignorability assumption, and tests the sensitivity of the inference to those deviations (see
Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Imbens, 2003; Blackwell, 2014).
A small number of studies use the logic of sensitivity analysis to address non-random mea-
surement error. The pioneering paper is Horowitz and Manski (1995), which analytically
derives bounds on a population mean given systematic measurement error in the sampling
procedure, using information on the maximum probability of data error. Both Imai and Ya-
mamoto (2010) and Kreider et al. (2012) extend this approach to the estimation of bounds
on the average treatment effect. Imai and Yamamoto (2010) examine a situation in which
there is misclassification in binary treatment assignment that is correlated with the out-
come (differential measurement error). They formulate the problem as a constrained linear
optimization, so assumptions are expressed as a linear equality plus inequality constraints.
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This is then used to solve for the sharp bounds of the ATE using an algorithm for linear
programming problems. Kreider et al. (2012) analytically derive sharp bounds on the ATE
of participation in a government program on various child health outcomes, given different
assumptions on the magnitude and patterns of participation misreporting in household sur-
veys. Finally, a Bayesian approach is taken by Tokdar et al. (2011), who develop a model of
tropical cyclone activity over time that incorporates beliefs about the detection capability
of different technologies as assumed priors.
Each of these studies develop a relatively complex model customized for a specific prob-
lem. In the next section, we generalize these different applications and introduce a gen-
eral framework to use sensitivity analysis for non-random measurement error, that is mis-
measurement of a variable systematically related to another variable.
Sensitivity Analysis for Non-Random Measurement Er-
ror
The sensitivity analysis approach to non-random measurement error asks: How would infer-
ence change if a variable suffered from non-random measurement error of various magnitudes?
And how large would the error have to be to alter a study’s conclusions? The procedure
consists of three steps, which we introduce in this section. A detailed guide that covers all
types of variables can be found in the Online Appendix.
Step 1: Quantifying Measurement Error
Suppose we have n observations of a variable T = (t1, . . . , tn), which can be either a de-
pendent or an independent variable. We suspect that T contains non-random measurement
error driven by a “corrupting variable” C = (c1, . . . , cn). This means that instead of T , we
observe X = (x1, . . . xn) = f(T |C). The first step for the sensitivity analysis is to quantify
the direction and potential magnitude of the error. That is, we model a “true” variable T ′
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as a function of X and C. How to specify T ′ depends on the measurement level of both C
and X. For simplicity, we begin with the case where C is binary.
Binary C
Assume we have reason to believe that an observed xi is accurate when ci = 0, but that xi
might be measured with error when ci = 1. For these observations, we need to specify what
the “true” T ′ look like given the observed X and a certain level of error. The way to do
this depends on whether X is binary, categorical, or continuous. Since the second option is
a straightforward extension of the first (see Online Appendix), we focus here on the binary
and continuous cases.
If X is binary, we specify a matrix of transition probabilities, as displayed in Panel (a)
of Table 1. That is, for each combination of X and C, we specify the probability that if
we observe a value of zero (one), the true observation is in fact one (zero). If we do not
suspect any measurement error for ci = 0, then P0(0 → 1) = P0(1 → 0) = 0, so t
′
i = xi in
both cases. For ci = 1, the transition probabilities depend on whether we believe there is
systematic under- or over-reporting. If the concern is under-reporting, then P1(1 → 0) = 0
and P1(0 → 1) = η. That is, observations for which ci = 1 and xi = 1 are assumed to be
correctly reported. But when ci = 1 and xi = 0, t
′
i = 1 with probability η. If η is close to zero
the under-reporting is small. If η = 1, then every single observation where ci = 1 and xi = 0
is misreported. If the concern is over-reporting, then P1(0→ 1) = 0 and P1(1→ 0) = η.
If the corrupted variable X is continuous, we need to specify a transition function instead
of a transition probability. This can be seen in Panel (b) of Table 1. Suppose again that
we only suspect measurement error for ci = 1. It follows that f0(xi) = xi. For the set of
observations where measurement error is suspected, we need to map the observed values X
to the simulated “true” values T ′ using a continuous function. One possibility is to model
the “true” value as the observed value times a constant: f1(xi) = ηxi. This means that the
simulated true value is η times the value of xi. No measurement error is η = 1. If η < 1 then
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Table 1: Transition probabilities and transition functions.
(a) Binary C, binary X
X
0 1
C
0 P0(0→ 1) P0(1→ 0)
1 P1(0→ 1) P1(1→ 0)
(b) Binary C, continuous X
X
C
0 f0(X)
1 f1(X)
(c) Continuous C, binary X
X
0 1
C P1(0→ 1|C) P1(1→ 0|C)
(d) Continuous C, continuous X
X
C f1(X|C)
we suspect that the true values are lower than the reported one’s, and if η > 1 we suspect
that they are higher.
The idea of the sensitivity analysis is to simulate T ′(η) for different values of η and see
how the results of interest change. What range of η should be chosen? If the direction
of the error is clear, one of the boundaries should correspond to no measurement error.
The ideal scenario to determine the other boundary is that the researcher has auxiliary
information on the magnitude of the measurement error. Even if conducted on different
populations, such studies give ballpark measures about the maximum magnitude of the non-
random measurement error. If no such “hard” data exists, advice from subject experts may
be available, or the researcher may have priors about the degree of measurement error. To
avoid confirmation bias, it is important that such priors are solicited before the sensitivity
analysis is conducted. For example, a researcher could specify the transition probabilities
or transition functions as well as the plausible magnitude of the error in a pre-registration
plan. Finally, the boundary can be set arbitrarily high so the researcher can determine the
value of η at which the substantive findings no longer hold.
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The functional form of the transition function can be more complex than simply multi-
plying xi with a constant η. It might be useful to specify a step function where there is no
measurement error for some values of X, but above a certain threshold measurement error
sets in. One could also use higher-order polynomials or logarithms.3
Continuous C
There are occasions in the social sciences where the corrupting variable C is continuous.
For example, measurement error may decrease (or increase) in GDP per capita, the rate
of urbanization, or time. If the corrupted variable X is binary, we again have to specify
transition probabilities (see Panel (c) of Table 1). But instead of setting different probabilities
for the different values of C, we now specify the transition probability as a continuous function
of C. This could be a simple linear function, a logistic function, or variations thereof. The
most complex case is the one where both the corrupting variable C and the corrupted variable
X are continuous. While only one function needs to be specified (Panel (d) in Table 1), it
needs to relate both C and X to T ′ at the same time. For a more detailed discussion, see
the Online Appendix.
Step 2: Simulation of Data
Having specified the transition probabilities or transition functions, the second step is to
simulate what T ′(η) looks like given different levels of measurement error. The basic idea is
to take m equally spaced values for η ∈ [η, η] and simulate T ′(η).
Just like in the first step, how to simulate T ′(η) and visualize how it compares to X
depends on whether the variable is binary or continuous.4 If X is binary we use transition
3 One could have an alternative functional form for measurement error where the error is additive, for
example ti = xi when ci = 0 and ti = xi + α when ci = 1. Monte Carlo results indicate that the coefficient
on xi will not be biased, though the coefficient for ci will be. Thus, if the functional form for measurement
error is thought to be constant and the interest is only in the effect of T but not of C, controlling for C will
suffice to get an unbiased estimate of T .
4 See the Online Appendix for the extension to categorical variables.
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probabilities, which makes it necessary to simulate the variable s times for each of the m
values of η. If X is continuous, there is no need to simulate repeatedly.
In this step, it is important to gain a firm understanding of what T ′(η) looks like for
different values of η. We recommend carefully examining variable summaries and cross
tabulations as well as to plot the simulated observations against the observed ones, for
example using scatter plots or density functions. We provide detailed examples in the Online
Appendix as well as our applications below.
Step 3: Model Re-Estimation with Simulated Data
The final step is to re-estimate the original model using the simulated T ′(η) instead of the
observed X for each of the m values of η ∈ [η, η]. This provides the inferential quantity of
interest, conditional on a given level of non-random measurement error.5 The results can
then be compared to the effect assuming no measurement error.
We recommend two ways to present the results of the sensitivity analysis. First, they
can be summarized graphically by plotting the effect of interest over the entire simulated
range of η. Second, a numerical summary can be given by determining the value of η at
which the original finding can no longer be supported by the data (e.g. before it is no longer
statistically different from zero at a given confidence level). We denote this value by η∗.
In many cases, η∗ is substantially meaningful and can easily be used to communicate the
results of the sensitivity analysis. In other cases it is helpful to compare the mismeasured
variable X to the simulated variable T ′(η∗) and report the value k∗ which solves the equation
E(T ′(η∗)) = E(X) + k∗ σ(X) (3)
where σ stands for the standard deviation. The value of k∗ tells us how many standard
deviations larger or smaller the mean of the true variable needs to be compared to the
5 If T ′(η) is binary, the original model should be run for the s variable draws of each step. To present
the inferential quantity of interest, the median point estimates and standard errors can be used.
12
observed variable before the effect of interest is no longer supported by the data. This makes
it possible to directly compare the sensitivity of different studies to systematic measurement
error.
Limitations
Performing a sensitivity analysis to investigate the effects of potential non-random mea-
surement error adds clarity and transparency to a study. But of course, this approach has
some limitations that scholars should keep in mind. Most importantly, a sensitivity analysis
cannot solve the problem of measurement error, since we do not know the exact relation
between the true and the observed variable. If we did, we would simply use T instead of
X. The goal of the sensitivity analysis is to specify plausible measurement error, and test
the robustness of one’s inference to this error. If a small amount of error fundamentally
changes the substantive inference the conclusion is clear, and the same is true if the results
are robust to almost any realistic degree of error. But if η∗ falls in the middle of a range
of plausible values, the case is more ambiguous. Sensitivity analysis will therefore be most
useful if coupled with an analysis of the error in the data, when information from auxiliary
sources is available, or when one has a strong set of beliefs about the measurement error.
But even though a sensitivity analysis cannot bring certainty about what the results would
be if the true data was available, it allows researchers to make informed quantitative state-
ments about the limitations of their finding. This provides greater transparency to readers
than informal assertions that the error is probably not “bad enough” to affect the findings
significantly.
Second, a sensitivity analysis necessarily involves making assumptions about the mag-
nitude and functional form of the measurement error. We usually have no way of testing
them. However, the fact that we need to make strong assumptions to conduct a sensitivity
analysis does not mean that not doing one is preferable. In fact, if we suspect that there
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is measurement error in the data, not conducting a sensitivity analysis makes the strongest
(and most likely wrongest) assumption of all.
Application: Settler Mortality and Comparative Devel-
opment
Having introduced the sensitivity analysis in a general way, we now apply it to two recent
debates about the role of non-random measurement error on inference.6 In our first ap-
plication, we address potentially non-random measurement error in Acemoglu, Johnson and
Robinson (2001). That paper argues that less extractive institutions lead to higher economic
development. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (AJR henceforth) uses historic differences
in European settler mortality as an instrument for institutional quality. Albouy (2012) ar-
gues that the settler mortality data contains non-random measurement error that is severe
enough to undermine the paper’s inference.
Because there is no single source for settler mortality rates, AJR combines data from
different sources. The mortality data for most countries comes not from European settlers,
but instead from European and American soldiers in the 19th century. For some countries
these rates are taken from soldiers at peace in barracks, while others are taken from soldiers
on campaign. This induces non-random measurement error because mortality rates for the
latter are thought to be higher than for the former. Albouy finds that the results in AJR
are not robust to removing the questionable data.
In their reply, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2012) state that “there is no justifi-
cation for discarding most of our data” and that “[s]imply throwing out data is certainly
not a reasonable approach to deal with this wealth of information” (Acemoglu, Johnson and
Robinson, 2012, 3078). With respect to the soldier mortality rates, they argue that “there
6 We also conduct a third sensitivity analysis, examining the effect of reporting bias in event data and the
link between cellphone coverage and political violence (Pierskalla and Hollenbach, 2013; Weidmann, 2016).
Due to space constraints, we relegate this application to the Online Appendix.
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was little difference in practice” (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2012, 3079) between
campaign and barracks rates. Both of these points motivate the kind of sensitivity analysis
that we advocate for in this article. The data that suffer from measurement error can indeed
still tell us something useful. However, we can do better than an informal statement that
the problem is not “bad enough” to invalidate the findings.
Step 1 – Quantifying Measurement Error: Not only is there suspicion that the
mortality rates based on soldiers on campaign are overestimates, we also have information
about the potential magnitude of the error. Citing Curtin (1989), Albouy notes that mor-
tality rates on campaigns were “66 to 2000 percent higher than barracks rates” (Albouy,
2012, 3064-65). However, this crucial information is never used in further analysis. The
simulation-based sensitivity analysis asks: What would the results look like given a certain
degree of measurement error? In this example, do the results of AJR hold when the mortality
rates for countries with campaign rates are 66 percent too high? 500 percent? 2000 percent?
Table 2: Transition functions for settler mortality rates X depending on the source of the data C.
X
C
0 f0(xi) = xi
1 f1(xi) = xi/η
Let xi be the observed mortality rate of country i, and let ci = 1 if xi is a campaign
rate. Table 2 shows the transition functions, where η ∈ [1, 21]. When η = 1, t′i = xi for all
observations, so there is no measurement error. When η = 21, the campaign rates are 21
times the barracks rate (2000 percent higher).
Step 2 – Simulation of Data: Given Table 2, we simulate what the variable would
look like for η between 1 and 21. Figure 2 plots how this affects the data. Panel (a) shows
the original log mortality data on the horizontal axis and log mortality given a certain value
of η on the vertical axis. The black dots are cases that do not use campaign rates, and the
open circles show those that do. The gray dots plot what the latter cases would look like
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for different values of η. Panel (b) plots what this implies for the densities of the log settler
mortality variable.
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Figure 2: Effect of η on log mortality rates. Panel (a): Original log mortality and log mortality
given η. Black dots: Cases do not use campaign rates. Open dots: Cases do use
campaign rates. Gray dots: What cases using campaign rates would be for given η.
Panel (b): Densities of original variable and those implied by different levels of η.
Step 3 – Model Re-Estimation with Simulated Data: Finally, we re-estimate
the model using our simulated variables with increasing amounts of error. The model is a
2SLS where the dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 1995 and the main independent
variable is the quality of institutions, proxied by the average expropriation risk between 1985
and 1995. The latter is instrumented by the log settler mortality rates.7
Figure 3 shows how the quantities of interest change conditional on the level of measure-
ment error. Panel (a) plots the first-stage coefficient of log settler mortality (given η) on
institutions. The relationship remains consistently and significantly negative unless the ratio
of campaign rates to barracks rates is larger than about 6.2. If the non-random measure-
ment error is greater than that, settler mortality no longer significantly predicts institutional
quality, raising questions about its validity as an instrument.
7 The specification also includes an indicator for mortality data derived from laborers.
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Figure 3: Effect of η on first and second stage coefficient. Point estimates with 95 percent confi-
dence intervals. Black vertical lines: no measurement error.
Panel (b) shows the instrumented second stage coefficient of institutions on economic
development. It stays positive and distinct from zero as long as the level of measurement
error is less than a factor of η∗ = 8.14. Beyond that, the standard error rapidly increases,
reflecting the fact that settler mortality has become a weak instrument. The mean of the
original log settler mortality variable is 4.657, with a standard deviation of 1.177. The mean
of T ′(η∗) is 3.248. From Equation (3), it follows that k∗ = −1.197. That is, the measurement
error must be severe enough so the average of the true variable is more than one standard
deviation smaller than the one of the observed one.
This means the decision to combine campaign rates with barracks rates to obtain a mea-
sure of settler mortality does not necessarily invalidate the inference in AJR. If campaign
rates are no more than 8 times higher than barracks rates, the positive link between insti-
tutions and economic prosperity finds support in the data. However, given the auxiliary
information on the severity of the measurement error, we cannot exclude the possibility that
the results are driven by the usage of data that over-reports mortality for certain countries.
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The sensitivity analysis thus moves the debate on this particular problem of non-random
measurement error away from two polar extremes. On the one hand, Albouy (2012) discards
all data points that are potentially mis-measured. On the other hand, Acemoglu, Johnson
and Robinson (2012) maintain that the difference between campaign and barracks rates is
too small to invalidate their results. Thanks to the sensitivity analysis, we now know just
how large the difference needs to be before the original results no longer find support in the
data.
Extensions
So far, we have deliberately focused on a simple setup of the sensitivity analysis: We assumed
that we know exactly which observations were affected by the measurement error, we assumed
that this error is equal for all of them, and we only looked at the effect of one corrupting
variable. In this section, we show how each of these assumptions can be relaxed. The goal
is not to provide an exhaustive list of extensions, or to demonstrate the one correct way to
conduct them. Instead, we want to demonstrate the versatility of the sensitivity analysis
approach.
Probabilistic Subset Affected by Measurement Error
The results above assume that every single country in which a rate taken from soldiers on
campaign (ci = 1) was used overstates the rate by a factor of η. But what if this is only
true for a subset of observations? The flexible sensitivity analysis framework we propose can
accommodate such a scenario by modifying the transition function in Table 2:
f1(xi) = ri
xi
η
+ (1− ri)xi
ri ∼ B(π)
(4)
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That is, a share π of the observations for which the rate was taken from soldiers on campaign
are assumed to have measurement error, while the rest does not.
Panel (a) of Figure 4 plots the p-value of the second-stage coefficient of institutions
conditional on the two parameters.8 If π is low, the coefficient is significantly different from
zero for all values of η. The higher the share of observations affected, the lower the value of
η at which the second-stage coefficient no longer reaches conventional levels of significance.
Probabilistic η
Another assumption we have made so far is that the degree of measurement error η is equal
for all affected observations. The factor by which campaign rates are higher than the barracks
rates might be larger in some countries than in others. We modify the transition function in
Table 2 as follows:
f1(xi) = xi/ηi
ηi = 1 + si
si ∼ Beta(η − 1, η − η)
(5)
for η ∈ [η, η]. This produces probabilistic draws of ηi with the expected value being equal to
η. Panel (b) of Figure 4 plots the point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals of the
second-stage coefficient, conditional on the expected value of ηi.
Multiple Corrupting Variables
Finally, we have assumed that assigning some countries rates from soldiers on campaign and
others from soldiers at peace is the only source of measurement error. What if there are
multiple corrupting variables? Albouy (2012) points to another issue in the data: rates for
Latin American countries are taken from mortality rates of bishops. These are benchmarked
to the mortality rate in Mexico (which is taken from French soldiers in campaign) by mul-
8 For each combination, we estimate 500 models and take the median p-value.
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tiplying them by 4.25. However, “the ratio of actual soldier to bishop mortality rates varies
from 0.98 to 10.80” (Albouy, 2012, 3064). Because the benchmarking is done using rates
from soldiers in campaign these two sources of mis-measurement are not independent, and
the rates for Latin American countries suffer from two sources of error.
Let ci = 1 if xi is a campaign rate and di = 1 if xi comes from bishops. The transition
functions are as follows:
f1(xi) = xi if ci = 0 and di = 0
f2(xi) =
xi
η
if ci = 1 and di = 0
f3(xi) =
η2
4.25 η
xi if ci = 1 and di = 1
(6)
Note that a combination of ci = 1 and di = 0 is not possible, since all rates that are
benchmarked using the bishops data are affected by potential error in the soldiers data.
Panel (c) in Figure 4 shows the p-values of the second-stage coefficient conditional on the
campaign/barracks rate and the benchmarking factor. There is an interactive effect between
the two potential sources of non-random measurement error. If the way the bishop data
are benchmarked in AJR leads to mortality rates that overstate the true level (η2=0.98),
the second stage coefficient of institutions is not significant at the 5 percent level once the
mortality of soldiers on campaigns is about 4 times higher than for those in barracks. If the
benchmarking leads to mortality rates that understate the true level (η2=11), the coefficient
ceases to be significant at a campaign/barracks rate of about 11.
Application: Leadership and Democratic Deliberation
Our second application addresses the possibility of non-random measurement error in a
binary variable. The study is a field experiment conducted by Humphreys, Masters and
Sandbu (2006) in the Democratic Republic of Sa˜o Tome´ and Pr´ıncipe. In 2004, the govern-
ment sponsored a series of meetings in which citizens met in small groups to discuss their
21
priorities for economic policy. They were asked whether they prefer spending on medical
clinics or hospitals, primary or secondary education, roads or public transportation, and
so on. Each group was lead by a randomly assigned discussion leader and the discussion
results on each policy choice recorded as a binary variable. The study finds that the policy
preferences of the leaders significantly influence the discussion outcomes.
However, the leaders’ preferences were measured after the groups had completed their
deliberations. The group outcome might thus have affected the leader’s stated preference.
A leader could falsely report their policy preference as similar to the preference of the group
to appear more effective, or because the discussion itself changed their mind. Alternatively,
the leader might falsely report that they had the opposite of the group’s preference to be
seen as fair and unbiased. The treatment assignment (leader opinion) therefore potentially
suffers from measurement error that is directly correlated with the outcome variable. Using
this example is particularly interesting since it allows us to compare our simulation-based
framework with the analytic sensitivity analysis proposed by Imai and Yamamoto (2010).
They show that the ATE includes zero when the maximum probability of misclassification
exceeds between close to zero and about 25 percent, depending on the question.
Denote the outcome of group discussion i on a certain policy with yi ∈ {0, 1}. Note that
in this application, the dependent variable is the corrupting factor, so we use Y instead of C.
The stated policy preference of the leader is xi ∈ {0, 1}. As discussed above, the direction of
the measurement error is not clear here. There are plausible reasons for discussion leaders
to misreport their policy preferences so they align with or diverge from the group outcome.
We therefore examine the two extreme scenarios.9
Panel (a) in Table 3 shows the transition probabilities for the scenario in which there
is no measurement error when the group outcome and the stated leader preference diverge.
When they are the same, the stated answer may not accurately reflect the pre-treatment
preference with probability η. In the second scenario, shown in Panel (b), we assume that
9 In the Online Appendix, we present results when both motives are present in different proportions.
22
Table 3: Transition probabilities for stated leader preference X and group discussion outcome Y.
(a) Transition probabilities when group outcome and
stated leader preference are the same
X
0 1
Y
0 P0(0→ 1) = η P0(1→ 0) = 0
1 P1(0→ 1) = 0 P1(1→ 0) = η
(b) Transition probabilities when group outcome and
stated leader preference diverge
X
0 1
Y
0 P0(0→ 1) = 0 P0(1→ 0) = η
1 P1(0→ 1) = η P1(1→ 0) = 0
there is no measurement error when the group outcome and the stated leader preference are
the same, but that there is measurement error with probability η when they diverge.
We follow Imai and Yamamoto (2010) and evaluate the entire range η ∈ [0, 1]. We
simulate 500 draws for each value of η and take the median coefficient and standard error
of the draws, which we then use to compute the ATE. The focus here is on one outcome
of the group discussions: Whether money should be invested in clinics (yi = 0) or hospitals
(yi = 1). A discussion of other questions can be found in the Online Appendix.
Figure 5 shows the results. Panel (a) is the first scenario, where we assume that some
leaders who report that their personal preference matches the group outcome are misclassi-
fied. Assuming no measurement error, the ATE is around 0.5. However, the ATE decreases
if it is the case that some leaders stated that their preference matched the group outcome
when in fact it did not. The ATE is no longer positive and statistically different from zero
for η∗ of around 0.1, so when 10 percent of leaders are misclassified. Once more than around
40 percent misstate their preference, the ATE is negative.
Panel (b) plots the scenario where we assume that some leaders who report that their
personal preference does not match the group outcome are misclassified. If this is the case,
there are in truth more leaders whose preference is the same as the group outcome. A naive
estimate that assumes no measurement error thus underestimates the ATE. The higher the
share of misclassified observations, the larger the effect of discussion leaders on the outcome.
How does our simulation-based sensitivity analysis compare to the analytical one pro-
posed by Imai and Yamamoto (2010)? In their approach, Imai and Yamamoto formulate
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Figure 5: Effect of η on the average treatment effect. Point estimates with 95 percent confidence
intervals. Black vertical lines: no measurement error.
the problem as a constrained linear optimization, so assumptions need to be expressed as a
linear equality and inequality constraints. This is then used to solve for the sharp bounds of
the ATE using an algorithm for linear programming problems.
The main difference between the two approaches in how the problem is set up is that we
express the potential measurement error as T ′ = Pr(X|Y, η), and their approach amounts
to specifying X = Pr(T ′|Y, ρ). While we quantify the true data conditional on the observed
data, they express the observed data conditional on the truth. However, the substantive
insights of both approaches are very similar.
The main difference in terms of execution is that Imai and Yamamoto are able to solve
for explicit analytical solutions of the large sample bounds. Because our approach relies
on simulations, it can only approximate solutions.10 At the same time, it places a lower
burden on applied researchers. Instead of having to formulate the problem in the form of a
constrained linear optimization, they only need to specify a simple equation relating C to X.
10 However, to find confidence intervals Imai and Yamamoto have to rely on a bootstrap, i.e. a simulation
method.
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Once the variable T ′ for different values of η has been simulated, the effect of non-random
measurement error can be assessed by simply re-running the original statistical model. This
makes it possible for researchers to routinely check the sensitivity of any of their results if
they suspect that non-random measurement error is present.
Conclusion
One of the most important prerequisites for valid scientific inference is accurate data. Un-
fortunately, this is often more difficult in the social sciences than in other disciplines. We
frequently have to rely on primary data collected for other purposes and by people who may
have incentives to not report everything accurately. Some measures we are interested in are
so difficult to quantify that some observations will be systematically more accurate than
others. And even if we can collect our own primary data, factors such as social desirability
bias, fear of repercussions, or research budget constraints may still be at work. That is to
say, non-random measurement error is a part of many political scientists’ life, no matter
their subfield or their preferred type of data.
This does not mean that we should not conduct studies using such data, as it still can
provide us with important information. At the same time, the bias introduced by non-
random measurement error cannot be ignored either. In this article, we have argued that
the threat to inference it poses should be addressed routinely. To aid researchers in doing
so, we have presented a simulation-based procedure that checks the sensitivity of results to
different levels of non-random measurement error. The major advantages of the sensitivity
analysis approach are that it can be used for any kind of data, variable, and statistical model,
that it does not require additional data typically not available in the social sciences, and
that it is comparatively simple to implement and communicate. This allows researchers to
routinely use it in their work.
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In recent years, political science research has undergone a remarkable transformation.
Studies now use sophisticated methodological techniques, and the identification revolution
has brought a focus on careful research design. Similarly, it is less and less acceptable to
only present a few select model specifications. Researchers now check the robustness of their
inference using different statistical estimators and various combinations of control variables
and data subsamples. They also employ alternative measures, account for missing data,
and examine the sensitivity to omitted variables. We believe that addressing measurement
error is the next logical step in this trajectory towards increased transparency and the
provision of better safeguards against “false positive” findings. Our hope is that this article
inspires researchers to think about potential non-random measurement error in their data,
and about how it may affect their inference. We also provide the conceptual framework and
the methodological tools to address the problem in a principled manner.
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